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It is a rare book that calls for a reflective article instead of the 
usual skimpy review. After a few pages it was apparent to me that Pro­
fessor Abe's volume was one of these exceptions: clear, very articulate, 
learned and immensely instructive, it places itself next to Nishitani 
Keiji’s Religion and Nothingness and Takeuchi Yoshinori’s Essence 
of Buddhism as one of those incomparable volumes of contemporary 
Buddhist philosophy to come out of the Kyoto School. I say incom­
parable because nothing like them has appeared elsewhere. There have 
been, to be sure, classic treatises in theology and the philosophy of 
religion to have emanated in our century from Western, that is, from 
Christian and Jewish, sources. But the horizon of even the greatest of 
these is limited to the traditions of Western philosophy and religion. In 
these works representing Japanese Buddhism, on the other hand, 
Western problems, themes and categories—both theological and philo­
sophical—intertwine with the entire scope of Buddhism to bring 
together, as nothing else to my knowledge has done, two of the major, 
but before our century independent, religious and cultural traditions of 
our globe. Professor Abe is peculiarly able to accomplish this stupen­
dous act of “dialogue”; as a student and then professor in both Japan 
and the United States, and for a decade the most indefatigable represen-
*The following is a review of Abe Masao’s Zen and Western Thought (1985), edited by 
William R. LaFleur and published by Macmillan Press Ltd., London, and the Univer­
sity of Hawaii Press, Honolulu, Hawaii.
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tative of the Buddhist viewpoint at dialogic conferences everywhere, he 
is more thoroughly at home in and master of both traditions than 
anyone else I know.
For me at least the most valuable element in this work (as in 
Nishitani’s and Takeuchi’s) is that the Buddhist viewpoint, or better, 
the Buddhist way of being in the world, is presented to us reflectively in 
the categories and modes of thought which we in the West can under­
stand and appropriate, as an answer to the problems for religion which 
we feel, that is, as a part of our contemporary reflection on the crises, 
possibilities and meanings of human existence. Thus while the view­
point presented is certainly different and possibly “strange” to us, the 
text as a whole is not; it takes its place along with I and Thou, The 
Courage to Be, and even The Epistle to the Romans as a text in “our” 
world—even though it contains a message quite unlike anything else in 
that world. In his introduction, editor William R. LaFleur is quite 
right; Abe presents Buddhism here as a powerful, relevant and per­
suasive alternative to Western philosophical views and religious ex­
istence, by no means (as we used to assess representatives of these tradi­
tions) anachronistic, antiquarian or “primitive”—nor in any way as an 
impoverished copy of Western thought and commitments. (LaFleur 
also correctly notes that, surprisingly, it is in theology and not in 
philosophy or in social science that thinkers in the West are submitting 
their own fundamental presuppositions to non-Westem criticism and 
influence.) Buddhism, like Hinduism and Sikhism, has long since ap­
peared in the West as a “possible” and powerful mode of personal 
religious existence; these works of Japanese Buddhism, however, re­
main so far the only examples of such non-Western religions reflective­
ly presented, and presented reflectively as viable, strong contemporary 
alternatives. In many ways it is from these volumes in religious 
philosophy that we can learn for the first time what Buddhism is actual­
ly like as a mode of religious existence, a mode for us—which is, after 
all, the only way authentic religious existence appears on the scene. It 
is, therefore, for what I learned in Professor Abe’s volume about Bud­
dhism that I am particularly grateful, and it is on the Buddhism that he 
presents that I wish to reflect in this article. I do not intend to sum­
marize the richness of Abe’s presentation of Buddhism. Rather, as a 
Westerner eager to understand what he says here, 1 want to continue 
the dialogue with him: to reflect on the major themes he presents, to 
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seek to “place” his thought in my own world, and thus to get inside it 
and so to understand it.
1. The Radical Religious Existentialism of Abe’s Philosophy
First of all, Abe begins with the question: is Zen a philosophy, and if 
not, what is it? The answer is both complex and to our traditions puzzl­
ing. As in verbal discussions with Buddhist thinkers, so here the initial 
surprise is the (to us) strangely dominant role that what seem to be 
philosophical (epistemological and metaphysical) judgments play in 
the religious existence of the Buddhist, or at least in Buddhist reflection 
on that existence. That is to say, it is repeated often that what we would 
term epistemological problems (that the self cannot know itself directly 
[5, 138] or that we think in terms of subjects and objects (6-7, 102], 
what Abe terms “substantive thinking”) represent the cause of human 
anxiety, estrangement and alienation (6-7, 102). That such
metaphysical judgments might lead to futile or even false thinking, to 
fundamental error, or that wrong religious doctrines lead to doctrinal 
error or heresy, Westerners would agree; but it puzzles them to find 
such intellectual assertions regarded as the cause of the “spiritual 
lostness” of humans, their personal religious problems. Clearly we 
tend to separate intellect and will, issues of philosophical truth on the 
one hand and issues of spiritual health, commitment or faith on the 
other more sharply than do the Buddhists. This is illustrated not only 
in the Western distinction between the “good” ontological structure of 
creation and the historical/personal character of the Fall, but also in 
the distinction between is and ought, fact and value, speculative theory 
and moral practice in secular philosophy. To Buddhists to think of 
reality as subjects and objects is inevitably to become attached to ob­
jects or to the self as subject (102); thus “substantive thinking” must 
cease or “be overcome” so that attachment to world and self is to 
cease. Correspondingly, if the self cannot know itself, it cannot “find” 
its true self—and is lost in ignorance (7-8, 138). Hence the 
philosophical truths of no permanent substance and no permanent 
self, and the metaphysical affirmation of endless dependent origination 
and anatta (no-self), are the basis for spiritual rebirth, for the fun­
damental spiritual metanoia necessary for salvation. Buddhism seems 
at first glance to be a religion based on a particular set of speculative 
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metaphysical affirmations, and even Buddhist salvation seems depen­
dent on intellectual agreement to these metaphysical doctrines.
This is, however, too simple—as Abe continually cautions us. Such 
an “intellectualistic” or “speculative” interpretation would in fact be 
an Hegelian (or possibly “Process”) interpretation of Buddhism as a 
religion whose fundamental structure is grounded in speculative truths 
of reason, truths important to the spiritual life but knowable on their 
own. Nothing could be more unBuddhist as Abe presents Buddhism. 
Over and over he reminds us that only with practice: religious ex­
istence, meditation, Zazen, the beginnings of non-attachment, can we 
understand at all these “truths” (56, 59, 66). In the end they are, he 
says, “existential truths,” truths not known speculatively (56) but only 
through our existential subjectivity (9-10, 16-18, 56-60), with the 
achievement that is of one's own Absolute Subjectivity. It is not that 
we have through thought achieved a concept of “something” or an Ab­
solute transcendent to subject and object, nor a concept of interdepen­
dent becoming or process—and then that we are as a result of those 
concepts spiritually transformed. Such “conceptualization” or “objec­
tification,” such “duality” of Absolute and self, of process and 
thinker, Abe continually rejects as futile, as remaining stuck in the sub­
ject-object world of duality. Only through practice does the self cleanse 
itself of attachments and reach enlightenment: we become unattached 
to objects and world, to self and to its past and future; we are untouch­
ed by driving desire for objects or self-interest in our continuing pro­
jects. Now we may begin to see the world and the seif as impermanent, 
endlessly appearing and disappearing. And with that “metaphysical vi­
sion” born of spiritual transformation, we can now understand what 
these truths say—or better, we are now what they express. A self empty 
of attachments, impermanent itself among changing and transient 
things, such a self is Emptiness and so understands Emptiness. It is 
now intensely real but real at a quite different level, free and utterly 
self-determined. It cannot think itself to that level; it must be it. “True 
Emptiness is not outside us, but the essential meaning of our deepest 
subjectivity: it is identical with ourself. I am Emptiness, Emptiness is in 
me” (160-1). Suddenly Buddhism as Abe presents it, however it may 
have appeared at first, is closer to Kierkegaard’s emphasis on existing 
as a Christian rather than conceiving Christianity as a system of 
thought than it is to the interpretation of religion characteristic of 
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either Hegel or Whitehead. If this is an epistemological and 
metaphysical mode of spirituality, it is very different from either the 
doctrinal theology or the metaphysical philosophy of the West. It is at 
best a religious mode of existing reflected into philosophical categories, 
not a philosophical mode of thinking resulting in a religion.
This same theme—that the religious element, the “piety,” deter­
mines the philosophical content and not the reverse—is underlined in 
Abe’s emphasis on the role of negation and the necessity of existential 
“leaps.” The actuality of ordinary experience—taken either cognitive­
ly or morally—is no place, says Abe, from which we can in thought pro­
ceed directly (109-10). Rather the whole realm of ordinary experience— 
subject-object, self-world, past potentialities leading to future ac­
tualization, this space here as continuous with that space there—this en­
tire realm must be negated (7-8); in effect a “leap” beyond substantive 
thinking must be made (15). This negation is existential, and it is total 
(8): we must appropriate the endlessness and impermanence of all in 
the world and the unattainability of the self, and we must realize in­
wardly the emptiness and negativity of all. We must, in fact, realize the 
endless continuity of living and dying as “the Great Death” (166).
This is, however, not all. Even this negation of ordinary experience, 
of self and world, must itself be further negated. Emptiness, Sunyata, 
Nirvana, the Buddha-Nature, these do not represent a transcendent 
reality beyond or distinct from the endless rush of passing things. For 
then a duality between Emptiness and world would remain; an attach­
ment to Emptiness and to the no-self would appear in ourselves; and 
the aim of achieving this higher stage would still dominate our present. 
Thus “Emptiness empties itself,” the true self negates the no-self and 
remains “cool” even to its own salvation. In this combination of, first, 
identity with endless transience and, second, of non-attachment to nir­
vana, the identity of the impermanent, unattainable self and the im­
permanent, endless world of appearance and disappearance (stage I) 
with Emptiness (stage II) is realized. And the essence of this perspective 
is that as existence and thought become one, so the endless becoming 
of finitude and Emptiness itself are one: samsara and nirvana are one. 
And when samsara is nirvana and nirvana samsara, the third stage is 
reached, and the great Life is opened up (166).
These stages are, as we have seen, existential. They are also radically 
discontinuous (15). Thus on these two counts the concepts that 
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thematize each stage are not intelligible; in fact they remain “mere con­
cepts,” until these stages have been realized existentially and in prac­
tice. Again there is no direct, intellectual or “rational” (speculative) 
route to these concepts (127). Now what has struck and fascinated me 
in this account is that clearly Buddhist philosophy—or at least Zen 
philosophy—is primarily existential-religious and not speculative; it is 
reflection on religion, on a certain mode of existing religiously, on (to 
use a traditional term) “piety.” It is not metaphysical explication con­
ducted on its own grounds and according to its own criteria. This is 
also true, so I believe, of much of the theology in the Christian tradi­
tion and of the thought in Judaism. In each of these religious traditions 
the concepts explicated express or thematize the universe within which 
the Christian, the Jew or the Buddhist exists when each exists religious­
ly. In all these cases, therefore, it is to the character of the “piety” that 
one must turn if one would understand, interpret or compare the 
speculative concepts (or becoming, of the self, of God) involved in the 
different religions. Abe has stated this point, so it seems to me, with ut­
ter clarity.
It was, therefore, a surprise to me when, in comparing the views of 
Zen with those of Whitehead, he compared the two systems directly, 
concept for concept, as if each represented a particular kind of 
metaphysical system. Thus Abe argued that what represented the ma­
jor difference between the two was that Whitehead’s system has God 
and his does not, and that the “God” described in Process thought 
transcended in certain regards the endless appearing and disappearing 
of all things. These judgments are, to be sure, quite correct, and the 
presence of the concept of God does represent a significant difference 
between the two “systems” which are metaphysically otherwise in­
terestingly similar. On Abe’s own grounds, however, the existential 
and religious differences in the two viewpoints are of much greater 
weight and significance. For each represents an utterly different, sharp­
ly contrasting, mode of being in the world, and these differences of pie­
ty give to the philosophical concepts of each, despite any surface 
similarities they may have, vastly different meanings; in effect they spell 
out vastly different universes.
As did Hegel, Whitehead gallantly tried to provide a more coherent 
and rational base to the positive modern Western view of existence: in 
nature as known by science, in community as understood in modern 
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social theory, and in history as known by historians. In effect, his effort 
was to give a rational account of the value-laden world of interdepen­
dent things in the developing process assumed in what he liked to term 
“civilization.” And for a multitude of good reasons he was sure that 
such a rational account of contemporary Western experience was possi­
ble only on the basis of a “non-substantial” philosophy of becoming 
rather than the traditional interpretation in terms of unchanging 
substances. Abe, on the other hand, radically negates participation 
(cognitive or moral) in that entire self-world or “terms and relations” 
process of becoming in order to return to it utterly transformed. Corre­
spondingly, the world to which he returns is itself utterly transformed, 
a passing world now emptied and drained of its interconnections and 
its apparent values, and in turn the self is emptied of its aims, unattach­
ed and so freed. World and self are not abandoned in the Mahayana; 
but they are, as Abe makes clear, thoroughly transformed, remade 
from top to bottom and from beginning to end and remade into “emp­
tiness,” an emptiness quite unattached to any sequence of becoming. 
No wonder, therefore, that Whitehead felt he had to construct a factor 
“God” in order to “explain” (give a metaphysical reason for) the 
developing order and value so apparent and pervasive to him in or­
dinary experience. In turn it is no surprise that Abe finds such a con­
cept both groundless and useless—for our ordinary experience of selves 
and world in temporal transition (on which Whitehead builds) must to 
Abe be negated in order that that entire realm of becoming be “over­
come,” be drained of desire or lure for its values and thus “emptied.” 
It is the piety not the metaphysics that provides the main distinction of 
Abe’s Buddhism from its Western counterparts.
2. The Radical “Naturalism” of Abe’s Buddhism
The second theme that struck me forcefully was the radically 
naturalistic character of the universe as viewed by Zen Buddhism. By 
that Western word I refer to the kind of metaphysical vision presented 
to us by the so-called non-reductionist naturalists of the first half of the 
American twentieth century: John Dewey, George Santayana, John 
Herman Randall, Jr. being possibly the most prominent examples. To 
them reality contains only “beings” in interdependent relations, beings 
that rise and fall in dependent causation; all are continually changing, 
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impermanent, transitory. Beyond them there is nothing transcendent 
or eternal: no Being Itself, no permanent substance, no Absolute 
Spirit, no God. Also, however, there is no immanent, all-determining 
causal mechanism; to insist that physical causation is universally domi­
nant is to them as parochial as to opt for the sole effectiveness of spirit. 
This is a naturalism (and thus not idealistic, pantheistic or theistic);but 
it is a non-reductionist naturalism; it denies a reduction to an all-deter­
mining materialism. Each finite being, therefore, is both caused and 
causing, arising dependently and yet partially self-determining, depen­
dent on its past and yet also effective in its future. To Dewey and San­
tayana their contemporary Whitehead ought to have confined his 
universe to these transitory beings and never added “God”; to 
Whitehead Dewey and Santayana could explain neither the order nor 
the value they assumed to be true of experienced reality without some 
more universal and pervasive factor. Interestingly, this non-theistic, 
non-reductionist naturalism is, so it seems to me, despite its explicitly 
non-religious character, metaphysically much closer to Abe’s Bud­
dhism than are most of the alternative religious visions: Brahmanic pan­
theism, Christian or Sikh theism, or the finite theism of Process 
thought. If we would better understand the queer, even paradoxical 
relationship between metaphysical judgments and “piety” in religious 
visions, it is with this sort of naturalism and not with either Hegel or 
Whitehead that we should compare Zen philosophy.
Throughout his discussion Abe underlines in a variety of ways his 
denial that there is any “reality” transcendent to “the beings.” The 
Buddha-Nature is not transcendent; it is not a substance whose at­
tributes are unnameable or limitless, permanent or unchanging; it is 
not a “something” beyond the beings (37-40). In effect, as he says, 
there is here no “ontological difference” between being and beings; 
“All beings are, however, just all beings, no more, no less; nothing is 
outside them” (47). Rather, the limitless, the transient, the imperma­
nent is the Buddha-Nature (37-49), and the Buddha-Nature is in turn 
the limitless, the transient, the impermanent. The beings as they are are 
all that there is: an endless process of coming to be and disappearing, 
all in dependent interrelation. This is, however, a vision to be ap­
propriated existentially, as we have seen. When we realize inwardly the 
endless process of coming and going, and appropriate as our reality its 
impermanence, its going, so to speak, nowhere, then utter non-attach- 
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ment to its limitless sequences begins to suffuse our inwardness. At this 
point the identity of our subjectivity with the limitless becomes clear, 
and with that the identity of both (our subjectivity and the endless pro­
cess) with the Buddha-Nature become clear. Our subjectivity thus 
becomes identical with all things and with the Buddha-Nature in Emp­
tiness, i.e., in total non-attachment. This is the meaning of Emptiness 
as it is the meaning of the identity of samsara and nirvana: when sam- 
sara is seen as sheer samsara, and nirvana is seen as identical with all 
this, then Emptiness is realized in and through their identity (see esp. 
48-52). We are emptied of attachments, aims, projects and goals; we 
have “cooled down” infinitely as a self in a world; we are unrelated to 
the temporal process: we are Emptiness. “For Dogen, impermanence 
itself is preaching impermanence, practicing impermanence, and realiz­
ing impermanence, and this, as it is, is preaching, practicing and realiz­
ing the Buddha-Nature” (52).
What is fascinating in this comparison, therefore, is the near identity 
of these two metaphysical visions with regard to the structure of reali­
ty, and yet the utter disparity of their religious ways, of their piety. For 
Dewey, Randall and the other neo-naturalists (Santayana was here an 
exception), this naturalistic metaphysical vision provides the only 
viable intellectual or philosophical basis of the creative Western way of 
being in the world. A way grounded in the scientific knowledge and the 
scientific method of thinking and guided by democratic, liberal ideals 
and moral aims, this vision expresses for them the modern way of self­
fulfillment in a free society, the way in which human social history will 
genuinely be enabled to progress. As there is for them no reality 
transcendent to the process of objective things or to the knowing and 
willing self, so in their vision of authentic existence there is no hint of a 
transcendent “piety,” a repudiation either of the subject-object world, 
the self-world (or organism-environment) “duality” in experiencing, 
thinking and planning, or of the natural (appraised) aims and ends of 
the self in the world. And the same applies to more recent Western 
views of “praxis,” Habermas, Bernstein, liberation theologies. They 
all assume the pluralistic world of becoming in time, and they all seek 
to remake it. As we have seen, however, for Abe this same 
metaphysical vision implies and necessitates a directly opposite mode 
of existing: the overcoming of the subject-object mode of thinking and 
the negation of attachment to all natural and social ends.
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The radical difference in piety between that of modern Western 
naturalism and Zen—despite their apparently similar metaphysical vi­
sions—is most clearly seen in the way each understands and assesses 
temporal sequence. For Western naturalism the meaning of life is fun­
damentally teleological, achieving ends through action over time. In­
telligence informed by science, says Dewey, and guided towards ap­
praised ends can achieve greater and greater satisfaction. Intelligence 
can unravel puzzles, resolve problems and recreate social anachronisms 
to an almost unlimited extent. Thus can “natural” sequences of 
events, whose values are “accidental” or “casual,” be redirected 
through intelligent control into a realm of secure values. With some­
what less euphoria, Whitehead would have agreed with Dewey here, as 
would most (though by no means all) twentieth century Western social 
thinkers. To all of them the fluidity and transience of events means 
their controllability by intelligence and so bespeaks the possibility, not 
the denial, of steady progress.
In the starkest contrast to this confidence in the developmental 
possibilities of temporal sequence, Abe negates the meaning of all the 
sequences in which the self participates. Nothing builds to a fruition, a 
satisfaction, an achievement either personal or social. “Substantial 
thinking,” a world made up of selves and objects, self and environ­
ment, past events and future projects, and the scientific intelligence 
built upon that world, is creative of estrangement and not of resolu­
tions; attachment to ends, natural or appraised, must be overcome and 
eradicated. All sequences of events lead nowhere, only to more desire 
and duality and the suffering consequent on both. Instead of an in­
telligently directed continuity of moments from puzzled past to pro­
blem-free future, the continuity of the moments of time must be 
negated (64) and the independence of each moment emphasized (64): 
“Only by being freed from aim-oriented human action both in practice 
and in enlightenment is Dogen’s idea of oneness of practice and end 
realized” (60); “this indicates complete discontinuity of time which is 
realized through negating a transition from one state to another” (63). 
“Only by the realization of the complete discontinuity of time and of 
the independent moment, i.e., only by the negation of temporality, 
does time become real time” (64). The true self is not achieved by in­
telligent action over time within the world; it is rather emptied of se­
quences as it is of all else. Through its realization of outer endless and 
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“pointless” impermanence, it empties itself of attachments to objects 
or to self, to memories and to projects alike, and so it empties itself of 
world and of self in time. In that cool emptiness it becomes identical 
with the endless process outside of it—it is both enlightened and releas­
ed. Unattached to any worldly meanings, it has become the mean­
ingless natural world in which it participates. Put this way, Abe’s Bud­
dhism seems, in truth, to be the more valid mode of “natural piety” in 
such a totally unstructured and transient universe than does the op­
timistic, rational, moral and progressivist humanism of Dewey!
In viewing these two in juxtaposition, one cannot help but wonder 
what sorts of secret baggage Dewey sneaked into his vision in order to 
make credible or possible the progressive worldly optimism he assumed 
to be “natural”—especially the amazing rational and moral capacities 
of his “naturalistically interpreted” human organism. Whitehead was 
perhaps right in his argument on this point with Dewey: “Without an 
Orderer,” he said, “there would be no order (and so neither reason nor 
morals) in a world of endless passage; and without such order, there 
would be no world: no order, no world.” Since (as all Westerners 
know) “there is a world,” thus there must be an Orderer. Buddhism is 
not nearly so sure about the proposition “since there is a world”—but 
both Buddhism and Whitehead agree that without an Orderer, the 
limitless passage of beings implies only emptiness!
The same comparison raises as well, however, interesting questions 
about Abe’s vision. In that world of endless, impermanent, interdepen­
dent “beings,” where no rational or moral structure “reigns” nor any 
fundamental teleology rules, how is the salvation that Buddhism pro­
mises and Abe describes possible? Compared to Hindu pantheism or 
Christian theism, this vision is naturalistic; but compared to the utter 
soullessness of modem scientific naturalism, this Buddhist vision seems 
laced with universal and effective “spiritual” structures. How is it possi­
ble that a Law of Karma, a moral law of cause and effect, rules every 
aspect of this endless and unstructured process of becoming if all is 
merely “coming to be and passing away”? How can it be that without 
some sort of “spiritual” character universal to this process, there is 
universally such full subjectivity and self-determination! After all, Ber­
trand Russell’s and B. F. Skinner’s worlds are also endlessly coming to 
be and passing away. How is it that when Absolute Subjectivity is 
achieved through non-attachment and emptiness, the true self is then 
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identical with all else in process (32, 42)? Abe argues repeatedly that if 
there is no transcendent Determinator in the universe (no God), then 
process is freed for self-determination; hence if existence is non- 
substantial, i.e., Empty, then self-determination is guaranteed (see esp. 
20-1, 38-39, 66-67). But as modern scientific naturalism shows, a 
transcendent reality or a deity do not represent the only metaphysical 
threats to self-determination; in fact they may, if properly interpreted, 
function as its sole guarantee. For a sequence of finite, natural causa­
tion—as depicted in physical science, in genetics, socio-bioiogy, 
behaviorist psychology, and so on—can stifle any hint of self-deter­
mination. To counter this—as to make credible any universal law of 
Karma or process of transmigration—(1) some sort of “spiritual” 
character to the universe is necessary, a character that comes to realiza­
tion in Absolute Subjectivity, that is, in the true or self-determining 
self, and that is present in all beings (42); and (2) a universal “moral” 
order within transmigration, an order of moral cause and effect cover­
ing all beings, is necessary so that Karma is possible. In other words, 
more must be there than merely “the realization of the endless process 
of appearing and disappearing of all beings at each moment” (35) if 
the Buddha-Nature as Abe describes it is to be possible. This meta­
physical “more” remained hidden over against the Hindu panthe­
istic and theistic systems among which Buddhism appeared and pro­
spered. This “more” is, however, revealed when the starkly secular, 
not to say physicalist, character of modern scientific naturalism is set 
beside Abe’s world of impermanent becoming. Perhaps, in the light of 
these points, some of the more “substantial” interpretations of the 
Mahayana make good sense.
There is much else in this volume every bit as worthy of extended 
discussion as these few issues I have raised. There are, of course, a 
minimal number of points of criticism: for example, his interpretation 
of “The Greeks” as essentially world-affirming and optimistic seems 
one-sided (96); and his interpretation of Christianity as basing evil and 
sin on the finitude of human beings (123, 190), is clearly a misinterpreta­
tion—though an “understandable misunderstanding” considering the 
very dominant role that metaphysical judgments concerning on­
tological structure have, as we have noted, for Buddhism.
Finally, a Westerner, whether Christian or humanist, cannot help 
but wonder why for Abe any hint of “dualism” is taken for granted as
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representing an objectively fatal problem for any viewpoint, however 
diverse from his own. Of course, any final distinction between self and 
world or between self-world and God is a problem within the Buddhist 
context he describes. As we have seen, it is there assumed that such 
ultimate distinctions of self and world or self-world and God—or of 
past and future, self and other selves—represent the very “substantial 
thinking'* and the realm of attachment that must be negated. Even if, 
as in most modern Western thought, the “dualities” are seen as in 
dependent interrelation to one another, and not as independent, self- 
sufficient “substances,” such permanent distinctions must be negated 
in Buddhism before samsara can be returned to “Emptiness.” If, 
however, it is that temporal world (of nature, selves, communities and 
history) that is regarded as potentially if not actually good and mean­
ingful, whether under God or on its own, then such “dualisms” only 
represent the variegated reality of selves and world which that view­
point seeks to affirm and renew. For most modern Western thought, 
religious or humanist, it is not the structure of finitude that is at fault 
or must be negated, whatever the source of our problems is thought to 
be. Abe is aware how non-universal and so questionable is the common 
Western assumption that being precedes non-being and is superior to it 
(cf. esp. chs. 4 and 5). In the same way, however, the assumption that 
duality in the sense of ultimate structural distinctions is universally a 
fault represents an aspect or implication of the Buddhist viewpoint 
itself and not an objective argument for that viewpoint.
This is an excellent volume, a model of dialogue writing. While he 
argues forcefully and persuasively for the intelligibility and creativity 
of the Buddhist viewpoint as he should—Professor Abe is well aware 
of the points where that view has revealed weaknesses, and where, 
therefore, it needs supplementation by Western emphases (cf. esp. ch. 
4). Above all, this volume provides us with an invaluable entrance into 
the spiritual world: metaphysical, existential, and religious, of the Zen 
Buddhist. All of us who are interested in a deeper understanding of 
Buddhism, and of our own relation to it, are thus now very deeply in 
Professor Abe's intellectual debt—as many of us have for long been in­
debted personally to him for his kind and thoughtful friendship.
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